Carlsen-Caruana, WCh 2018 – Game 3
A rather unconvincing showing by both players.
Caruana deviated from Game 1 and chose the rare 6 0-0 in the Rossolimo (I’m afraid we won’t be seeing an Open Sicilian any time soon). The omission of h3 introduces many subtleties in the upcoming middlegame as a lot depends on the plan Black chooses.
Carlsen also chose a rare move, 6…Qc7, as the queen is often not placed here in the Rossolimo structures. After some natural moves were made it transpired that White had the more comfortable position. As Grischuk put it, he had a good version of the Anti-Berlin (and I joked on Twitter that everything in modern theory is about the Anti-Berlin, even the Sicilian!).
Caruana decided to keep control and not grab the c5-pawn and on move 10 it seems that Carlsen miscalculated something because after the exchange on f3 and b4 White had the obvious pressure on the queenside. But then it was Caruana’s turn to commit an inaccuracy – he even called his 15th move a blackout.
Even though he still kept chances to maintain some pressure, it seems that Caruana immediately switched to playing for a draw and this premature change of direction shifted the momentum to Carlsen.
Momentum is extremely important in chess, often more important than the objective evaluation of the position. All top players sense the momentum and its changes and I would even go as far as to say that Carlsen, together with Karpov before him, are the best “momentum” players, easily switching to playing for a win after they had felt that they are not in danger anymore.
Carlsen did start to apply pressure, but luckily for Caruana the position was too simple for him to go wrong. Perhaps it was possible for Carlsen to be even more precise in the endgame, but I doubt that would have altered the final result.
A disappointing game for Caruana, who easily misplayed his opening advantage, and for Carlsen, whose opening preparation wasn’t up to the task.
The first and this game got me thinking about whether the choice of the Rossolimo is the best suited one for Caruana. In the maneuvering positions that arise it appears that Carlsen feels more comfortable, at least for the time being. A mistake in the strategy (allowing to end up in positions that are better suited for the opponent) can cost Caruana dearly. As a comparison, I’d remind you of Tal’s choice of the Advance Variation in the Caro-Kann in his return match against Botvinnik. Tal was well-prepared and was obtaining decent positions after the opening, but the character of the positions was more in Botvinnik’s style and he managed to outplay Tal in the ensuing middlegames. Are we going to witness something similar in London?
Here’s Game 3 with detailed analysis.